SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope to
assist the legal community in keeping abreast ofsome of the more interesting
changes in significant areas ofpractice.
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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-DAMAGES-PUNITIVE DAMAGES RECOVERABLE IN STRICT LIABILITY ACTION-Fischer v. Johns-

Manville Corp., 193 N.J. Super. 113, 472 A.2d 577 (App. Div.
1984), certif granted, (May 16, 1984).
From 1938 through 1942, and for four months during 1945,
James Fischer worked for Asbestos Ltd. His job duties included the
regular handling of asbestos and materials that contained asbestos.
He did not wear protective clothing and was never advised that inhalation of asbestos dust was hazardous. In 1977, Fischer was diagnosed as suffering from an asbestos-related pulmonary disease.
Medication was prescribed, which caused him to develop diabetes,
rheumatoid arthritis, and osteoporosis. He suffered a heart attack in
1980, and did not return to work. 193 N.J. Super. at 116, 472 A.2d
at 579. His treating physician testified that his disability was "60%
due to asbestos exposure and the side effects of the medication he
took to alleviate those pulmonary problems." Id. at 116-17, 472 A.2d
at 579.
Fischer brought a strict liability action against the companies
that supplied asbestos to his employer and demanded punitive as
well as compensatory damages. Id. at 115, 472 A.2d at 578. He alleged both that the defendants failed to warn him of the dangers of
inhaling asbestos and that they had consciously withheld knowledge
of those dangers from the public. Id. at 117, 472 A.2d at 579-80. The
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 116, 472 A.2d at 579. On appeal
the defendants, Johns-Manville Corporation and Bell Asbestos
Mines, challenged the punitive award on two grounds. First, they
argued that, under New Jersey law, punitive damages are not recoverable in strict liability actions. Second, they asserted that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support the award. The
appellate division rejected both challenges and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 115, 472 A.2d at 579.

216

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:214

The appellate division observed that punitive damages "are allowable in exceptional and egregious instances for the purpose of
punishing the tortfeasor and deterring both him and others from like
conduct." Id. at 120, 472 A.2d at 581. In concluding that these goals
were consistent with the principles underlying strict liability, the
court canvassed the more than twenty jurisdictions throughout the
country that had addressed the question. Id. at 122-23, 472 A.2d at
582-83. The only court to hold punitive damages unavailable in
strict liability actions, the Fischerpanel found, was the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, which had done so in
Goldv.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 553 F. Supp. 482 (D.N.J. 1982). In
Gold, Judge Ackerman predicted the decisional trend of the New
Jersey courts. 193 N.J. Super. at 123, 472 A.2d at 583. The Fischer
court expressly rejected his forecast. Id. at 123-24, 472 A.2d at 583.
The theoretical basis of the court's decision in Gold, and the view
of the Fischer defendants, was that New Jersey's adherence to rigid
product-oriented principles of strict liability is logically inconsistent
with a conduct-oriented cause of action for punitive damages. Id. at
124, 472 A.2d at 583-84. In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90
N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982), the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that in a strict liability action based upon an alleged failure to warn
of product dangers, a defendant would be deemed to have knowledge
of those dangers that were shown to exist at the time of trial. Such
knowledge was to be imputed to manufacturers and distributors even
if the dangers were scientifically undiscoverable at the time of manufacture. See 90 N.J. at 209, 447 A.2d at 549. Thus, a plaintiff was
relieved, in a warnings case, of the necessity of proving improper conduct in the design and manufacturing process. The Fischer court determined that the rule announced in Beshada, while easing the
plaintiff's burden of persuasion with regard to compensatory damages, was not intended to prevent him from proving a defendant's
wrongful conduct in order to recover punitive damages. 193 N.J.
Super. at 124, 472 A.2d at 584. The panel reasoned that " '[b]y dispensing with the need to prove fault for purposes of establishing liability. . . the law of strict liability does not preclude consideration of
'aggravated fault,' if the plaintiffs can properly meet their burden of
demonstrating sufficient evidence of the defendant's outrageous conduct.'" Id. at 125, 472 A.2d at 584 (quoting Neal v. Carey Canadian
Mines, 548 F. Supp. 357, 378 (E.D. Pa. 1982)). The court concluded
that Fischer had met his burden and held that the need to deter similar conduct in the future outweighed the potential exposure of de-
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fendants in mass tort litigation-like Johns-Manville and Bell-to
multiple punitive damage awards. Id. at 127-29, 472 A.2d at 586-87.
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the appellate division noted that New Jersey has long been "in the vanguard of the
development of a responsive and progressive products liability law."
Id. at 124, 472 A.2d at 583. This leadership role, however, illustrates
the inherent weakness in adopting a rule of law based on the application of strict liability principles in other jurisdictions. At present, the
law of products liability in New Jersey, as applied in asbestos cases,
emanates from the supreme court's decision in Beshada. That view,
for the most part, has not been adopted by jurisdictions that allow
punitive damages in strict liability actions. The Beshada court severely restricted the defenses available to manufacturers and distributors. Proof that product dangers were not scientifically cognizable
at the time of manufacture thus will not, under New Jersey law, defeat a plaintiffs cause of action for compensatory damages. In many
of those jurisdictions cited by the Fischercourt, such proofs will defeat
the cause of action. A defendant in those jurisdictions, therefore, although facing potential liability for punitive damages, may escape
liability altogether by proving that the product marketed was the
safest product possible at the time of manufacture.
Moreover, the justifications offered by the court in promulgating the Beshada rule included the need to avoid confusing the jury
with complex "state-of-the-art" proofs and the desire to ease the
plaintiff's overall burden of proof. See 90 N.J. at 207-08, 447 A.2d at
548-49. By affording a plaintiff the opportunity to offer proofs concerning a defendant's conduct, the court has re-injected these complicated considerations into the fact-finding process without restoring
the defense that had been precluded in order to allow the plaintiff to
avoid these issues. Applying Beshada and Fischer in tandem, therefore, results in a legal windfall to plaintiffs who may now raise formerly undesirable factual questions with impunity. Basic notions of
fairness dictate a balancing of interests where rules of law have been
forged as a means of simplifying the litigation process. Toward this
end, the defense stricken in Beshada could be offset by striking punitive claims in strict liability actions. Alternatively, Beshada's principle of assumed knowledge could be stricken and punitive claims
allowed. The latter solution would work no injustice to a plaintiff
because proof of a defendant's egregious conduct would establish
grounds for compensatory as well as punitive damages.
Ultimately, the decision in Fischer remains that of an intermediate appellate court. The supreme court recently granted certification

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

218

[Vol. 15:214

to review the appellate division's judgment. 114 N.J.L.J. 144 (1984).
Given the distinctive nature of products liability law in New Jersey,
the court is encouraged to carefully re-examine its decision in Beshada
and the compatibility of punitive damages with the theory of liability espoused in that case. Mindful of the fact that those jurisdictions
that permit punitive damages have not extended strict liability as far
as New Jersey, it is perhaps time to conform the law of this state to
that in the jurisdictions that were cited with approval by the appellate division in Fischer.
James B. Clark
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FACTORY
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NEGLIGENT

SALE

IN
OF

MACHINE-Green v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 95 N.J. 263, 471 A.2d
15 (1984).
In January 1977, John Green's right hand was crushed between
the presses of the plastic blowmolding machine he was operating at
the Merlin Manufacturing Company. 95 N.J. at 265-67, 471 A.2d at
16-17. Although Green had operated the machine several times prior
to the accident, he testified that he had never been warned of the
dangers involved in reaching inside it. IM. at 267, 471 A.2d at 17.
The machine was not equipped with any safety devices that would
have rendered it inoperable while the operator's hands were in close
proximity to the presses. Green's expert testified that such devices
were available at the time the machine was manufactured. Id. at
267-68, 471 A.2d at 18.
Green sued the machine's manufacturer, Transogram Company, and proceeded on negligence and strict liability theories. After
the jury returned its verdict, the trial court dismissed the strict liability counts. In response to the court's special interrogatories, the jury
found that Transogram had been negligent in selling the blowmolding machine to Merlin but that Green's injuries were seventy-five
percent attributable to his own negligence. As a result, the court entered judgment for the defendant pursuant to the New Jersey Com-

parative Negligence Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.2(c) (West Cum.
Supp. 1983-1984). 95 N.J. at 268, 471 A.2d at 18. On appeal, the
plaintiff challenged the trial court's application of contributory and
comparative negligence principles to his negligence action. Green ar-
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gued that because the defense was unavailable in strict liability actions brought by factory workers, it should not be available to
defendants in negligence actions arising out of similar factual settings. The appellate division disagreed and held that " 'absent a basis

for strict

liability,

.

.

.

ordinary

principles

of comparative

negligence [should] apply.' " That court, however, determined that
portions of the defense counsel's cross-examination had been improper and remanded the matter for a new trial. Id. at 269, 471 A.2d
at 18-19. The supreme court granted certification. It reversed the
appellate court's decision and ordered that judgment be entered in
favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 273, 471 A.2d at 20.
Initially, the supreme court reviewed its earlier decisions precluding use of the contributory negligence defense in strict liability
actions involving factory workers. Those decisions had recognized a
"special circumstances" exception for factory workers who, in the
court's view, had "no real choice" in deciding whether or not to operate machines to which they had been assigned as an incident of their
employment. Moreover, the earlier decisions were predicated upon
the court's public policy determination that safety devices should be
provided to guard against the consequences of employee negligence
and that, accordingly, manufacturers should not be absolved from
liability as a result of" 'the very eventuality the safety devices were
designed to guard against.'" Id. at 271, 471 A.2d at 19 (quoting Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 412, 290 A.2d 281, 286 (1972)).
The Green court reasoned that the same considerations governed
claims by factory workers arising out of the negligent sale of unsafe
machinery. Id. at 272-73, 471 A.2d at 20.
The court's holding in Green was an extremely narrow one. Justice Clifford, writing for a unanimous court, was careful to point out
that the "plaintiff's conduct here amounted to no more than ordinary carelessness," and he distinguished such conduct from situations
in which a plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably encounters a
known risk. Id. at 270, 471 A.2d at 19. In Suter v. San Angelo Foundr
& Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979), a strict liability
action, Justices Clifford, Mountain, and Sullivan expressed their belief that the contributory negligence defense should be available
where the plaintiffs conduct is voluntary, knowing, and unreasonable. By limiting its holding to cases involving "ordinary negligence,"
the Green court avoided renewal of the Suter debate. Inevitably, however, the court will be called upon to decide the issue. Given the
myriad possible causes of industrial accidents, it is to be hoped that
when the court is finally faced with this question it will carefully
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reconsider its preclusion of the contributory negligence defense in
cases where a factory worker's negligence transcends mere inadvertence or ordinary carelessness. Disregard for known dangers advances neither public nor private interests, and the court should not
be seen as endorsing such conduct in the factory or any other setting.
Joan M Neri

TORTS--DAMAGES-EMOTIONAL
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE
BYSTANDER UNRELATED TO VICTIM-Et'ch v. Dam, 193

BY

N.J.

Super. 244, 473 A.2d 539 (App. Div. 1984).
On June 7, 1979, Edward and Patricia Eyrich attended a performance of Roberts Bros. Circus in Washington Township, along
with their three children and a five-year-old neighbor, Jay-Jay Vacarezza. 193 N.J. Super. at 247-48, 473 A.2d at 541. Upon their
arrival, the Eyrichs and young Vacarezza took seats in the bleachers
around the circus's three rings. An animal act, Miss Constancia
Leopard and Jaguar, was first on the program. Shortly after the performance began, Jay-Jay was taken by one of the Eyrichs' daughters
to use the bathroom. Id. at 248, 473 A.2d at 541. While returning
from the restroom, the boy was seized by one of the performing leopards and dragged under an empty transport car. Id. at 248-49, 473
A.2d at 541. Edward Eyrich immediately went to Jay-Jay's aid,
wrestled with the leopard, and was slightly injured. After the child
was removed from the animal's jaws, Eyrich carried him from the
circus tent and accompanied him to the hospital. The leopard
wounds, however, proved fatal and Jay-Jay died from loss of blood at
the hospital. Id. at 249, 473 A.2d at 541.
Following the attack,the Eyrichs suffered severe depressive neurosis. Mrs. Eyrich, citing her psychological inability to continue her
employment, resigned from her job at a local nursery school. Her
husband experienced recurring olfactory hallucinations and developed a fear of cats and other animals. Id. at 251, 473 A.2d at 542-43.
As a result, Edward and Patricia Eyrich each sought to recover damages from the circus's operators for their emotional and psychological
injuries. Id. at 247, 473 A.2d at 540-41. The trial court, on the defendants' motions for summary judgment, held that such injuries
were not compensable and dismissed the Eyrichs' complaint. Id. at
252, 473 A.2d at 543. The appellate division affirmed the dismissal
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of Mrs. Eyrich's claims but reinstated those of her husband. Id. at
261, 473 A.2d at 548.
Initially, the appellate panel distinguished Mr. Eyrich's role as a
participant in the rescue attempt from Mrs. Eyrich's role as a bystander. In doing so, the court considered itself bound by the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Portee v. Jafe, 84 N.J. 88,
417 A.2d 521 (1980), which had strictly limited a bystander's right to
recover damages for emotional injuries resulting from the mere observation of injury to another. 193 N.J. Super. at 259, 473 A.2d at
547. In Portee, the court held such damages to be recoverable only
where: (1) the bystander actually witnessed the negligently inflicted
death or serious physical injury of another; (2) a marital or intimate
familial relationship existed between the bystander and the victim;
and (3) the resultant emotional distress was severe. 84 N.J. at 101,
417 A.2d at 528. The Eyr'ch court declined to extend Portee beyond
these narrow boundaries and held that the absence of a familial relationship between Mrs. Eyrich and Jay-Jay barred her claims for
emotional damages. 193 N.J. Super. at 259, 473 A.2d at 547.
With respect to the claims of Edward Eyrich, however, the court
held that Portee was not controlling. Id. at 255, 473 A.2d at 545. The
court determined that Mr. Eyrich's emotional condition was inextricably "intertwined with his own physical participation in the event,"
id. at 258, 473 A.2d at 546-47, and reasoned that Eyrich's participation brought him within the general rule that damages for emotional
injuries are recoverable where such injuries are accompanied by a
physical impact. Id. at 252, 473 A.2d at 543. Moreover, the court
found that Eyrich's damages were not limited to the "psychological
sequelae of fear for himself but rather comprehend all of the psychological sequelae which as a matter of reasonable foreseeability result
from the episode as a whole." M. at 256-57, 473 A.2d at 545-46.
Despite its refusal to extend the rule in Portee in order to allow
Patricia Eyrich to prosecute her claims, the appellate division worked
a backhanded extension of that rule by allowing Edward Eyrich to
proceed. Prior to Eyrz'h, two separate and distinct theories of recovery were recognized. Under the first of these, emotional injuries were
compensable if a person either was placed in danger of or actually
suffered physical harm as the result of another's negligence. Traditionally, these damages were awarded only for the emotional distress
caused by one's fear for his own safety. Under Portee, the scope of
recoverable damages was expanded to encompass the emotional
trauma associated with witnessing the death or serious physical injury of another. The class of persons who could recover for this type
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of distress, however, was limited to those with an intimate familial or
marital relationship with the victim. In sustaining Edward Eyrich's
cause of action, the court engaged in the hybridization of these theories by sanctioning an award for the shock of witnessing another's
injury without adhering to the Portee requirements. Unfortunately,
the case upon which the court relied in reaching this result, Greenberg
v. Stanley, 51 N.J. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (App. Div. 1958), modified
on othergrounds, 30 N.J. 485, 153 A.2d 833 (1959), is factually distinguishable and inapposite to the facts in Eyrch.
In Greenberg, a mother walking her infant daughter in a baby
carriage was struck by an automobile. The child was killed and the
mother seriously injured. 51 NJ. Super. at 94, 143 A.2d at 590. The
court found that the "sudden, unexpected and severe physical
trauma was inextricably intertwined with the emotional shock over
the simultaneous fatal injury," i. at 105-06, 143 A.2d at 597, and
reasoned that "[t]here was no basis to differentiate the fear caused
the plaintiff for [her]self and for [her child]." Id. at 108, 143 A.2d at
598. Thus, the plaintiff's injuries were considered the indistinguishable manifestations of the combined physical and emotional impacts.
Similarly, the plaintiff's fear for herself was inseparable from her fear
for her child. By contrast, in Eyrch, the physical impact to the plaintiff was slight. Any physical or emotional trauma suffered as a result
of Edward Eyrich's contact with the leopard was clearly distinguishable from the shock, fear, and grief arising out of the attack on JayJay. Hence, the indistinguishable injury present in Greenberg did not
exist. In addition, the familial relationship between plaintiff and victim in Greenberg was absent in Eyrich. Consequently, even if the results of the emotional and physical impacts in Greenberg were
separable, application of the Portee criteria in that case would have
resulted in a recovery for emotional distress, while their application
in Eyrzch would not. As a result, the court, although averring deference to Portee, has blurred the clear line drawn in that decision and
opened the door to recovery for nebulous injuries suffered by "participants" in accidents and other misadventures.
David Michael Fabian
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ETHICS-ATrORNEYS

BOUND BY Disci-

BARRING BROADCAST ADVERTISING

DESPITE

LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS CONCERNING RULE'S CONSTITUTION-

ALITY-In re Fme'ster,95 N.J. 431, 471 A.2d 775 (1984).
Prior to January 1984, DR 2-101(D) prohibited paid broadcast
advertising by attorneys. 95 NJ. at 432, 442, 471 A.2d at 775, 781.
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in In re R.MJ.,
445 U.S. 191 (1982), which called into question the constitutional
validity of such a blanket prohibition, the New Jersey Supreme
Court appointed a committee to evaluate the rules governing attorney advertising. The committee was directed to report its findings
and recommendations to the court by January 1, 1983. 95 N.J. at
441, 471 A.2d at 780.
On December 6 and 7, 1982, two New Jersey attorneys, Robert
Felmeister and Hanan Isaacs, intentionally violated DR 2-101 (D) by
advertising their services on the radio. They did so fully cognizant
that the state supreme court was considering changes in the rule. Id.
at 433-35, 471 A.2d at 776-77. Immediately thereafter, the Division
of Ethics and Professional Services filed complaints against
Felmeister and Isaacs charging them with willful and deliberate violation of DR 2-101(D), and with contempt of the supreme court's
rulemaking authority in violation of DR 1-102(A)(1), (5), and (6). Id.
at 435, 471 A.2d at 777. The attorneys raised a first amendment
challenge to the validity of DR 2-101(D) and sought the supreme
court's interlocutory review of the constitutional issues. The court
consented to hear the case but denied the respondents' motions to
dismiss the proceedings before the Ethics Committee. Id. at 432-33,
471 A.2d at 775-76. Thus, the court found it unnecessary to decide
the constitutional question and determined that the primary issue
was the scope of its authority to compel obedience to its rules of attorney conduct. Id. at 442, 471 A.2d at 781.
In setting aside the constitutional issue, the court distinguished
between political and commercial speech. Id. at 435-36, 471 A.2d at
777. The court noted that the respondents' challenge asserted the
rule's "overbreadth" and that such challenges were not available in
the context of commercial speech. Id.at 446, 471 A.2d at 783. In
addition, the court stated that the constitutional challenge could,
and should, have been made in a suit for declaratory judgment. Id.
at 444-45, 471 A.2d at 782. Finally, the court determined that even
when a statute has been held to be unconstitutional, "enforcement
thereafter during an interim period for good and sufficient reason is
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permissible." Id. at 444, 471 A.2d at 782. Thus, the majority perceived no obstacle to its enforcement of DR 2-101(D). Id.
The court next weighed its interest in enforcing its disciplinary
rules against the respondents' right to be free from interference with
their activities. In the process, the court placed great emphasis on its
responsibility to assure "orderly change" in rulemaking, its authority
to regulate the legal profession, and its duty to protect the public. Id.
at 442-43, 471 A.2d at 781. In finding that the respondents' exercise
of commercial speech via the broadcast media did not serve a "great
public interest," the court concluded that, on balance, it was fair to
require attorneys to comply with disciplinary rules of questionable
constitutional validity pending resolution of such questions through
the rulemaking process. Id.at 447-48, 471 A.2d at 783-84.
Justice Handler, in dissent, did not disagree with the majority's
assessment of the need to insure compliance with the court's rules.
He did, however, disagree with the majority's view that a constitutional determination was unnecessary. Id. at 448-49, 471 A.2d at 784
(Handler, J., dissenting). In his view, evaluation of the rule's constitutional status was essential to the court's determination to sanction
further disciplinary action in this case. Because he had "little doubt"
that the rule was unconstitutional, he felt that the court should not
insist on its enforcement. Id. at 449, 471 A.2d at 784 (Handler, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, he believed that, given the "innocuous" nature of the violation, a decision to terminate disciplinary proceedings
in this case would not undermine the supreme court's efforts in regulating attorney conduct. Id at 450, 471 A.2d at 785 (Handler, J.,
dissenting).
Strikingly, neither the majority nor the dissent argued that former DR 2-101(D) was constitutional. Both opinions upheld the
court's authority to command compliance with its rules-including
those under constitutional challenge. The dissent, however, asserted
that those rules should not "be applied now as offensive disciplinary
weapons." Id By contrast, the majority responded to the disciplinary issue involved. It set aside the constitutional issue precisely in
order to be free to sanction discipline. In doing so, the court was
meeting its primary responsibility, which is to assure respect for the
judicial process itself. Where attorneys deliberately violate the
court's rules, and knowingly fail to pursue available judicial remedies, the court must act to maintain its own authority.
Rollin A. Stearns, Jr.
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WORKERS'

COMPENSATION--1979 AMENDMENTS PERMIT
To INCREASE AWARDS-Posw'alowsk'v.

STACKING OF INJURIES

StandardChlorine Chemical Co., 96 N.J. 321, 475 A.2d 1257 (1984).
The 1979 amendments to the New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act drastically altered the formula for awarding benefits to an
injured worker. N.J. STAT. ANN. §34:15-1 to -128 (West Cum. Supp.
1984-1985). Under the former schedule, awards were determined by
converting a worker's disability into a set number of weeks and paying the worker a flat rate of compensation, with a maximum of
$40.00 for each week of disability. 96 N.J. at 323, 475 A.2d at 1258.
The revised schedule augments the weekly rate as the percentage of
disability increases until a maximum of seventy-five percent of statewide average weekly wage is reached. It is much more profitable,
therefore, for an injured worker to "stack" each of his injuries into
one disability to create a larger number of weeks at a greater rate of
compensation. Id at 324-25, 475 A.2d at 1258-59. The supreme
court recently granted certification in three cases to determine
"whether multiple injuries arising out of the same accident should be
compensated separately or cumulatively under the revised schedule
of payments." Id at 323, 475 A.2d at 1258.
Steve Poswiatowski injured his back and left foot when he fell
onto a concrete landing. The compensation court assigned separate
awards for those injuries and for a resultant neuropsychiatric injury
totaling $13,172. Poswiatowski contested the award, claiming that it
should have been calculated by combining the weeks attributable to
each injury, thereby utilizing a higher rate of compensation for a
total award of $33,456. The appellate division rejected Poswiatowski's argument and affirmed the award. Id. at 325, 475 A.2d at 1259.
Carol Rae Fagan, a public health nurse, was robbed and severely beaten while on a house call. She sustained a concussion, fractured nose, facial scarring, and sinus disorders, which were followed
by facial numbness, periodic severe headaches, and recurrent nightmares. The compensation court "stacked" the weeks for each injury
and awarded a total of $10,314. The appellate division reversed and,
based upon separately calculated awards, reduced the compensation
court's award to $8,460. Id at 326, 475 A.2d at 1259-60.
Edward Smith's right forearm was severely crushed under a toppled crane. Id at 326-27, 475 A.2d at 1260. To repair the arm, skin
had to be grafted from Smith's abdomen and thigh. As a result, his
arm was attached to the right side of his abdomen for three months,
resulting in permanent scarring of the forearm, abdomen, and thigh.
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The compensation court separately assessed Smith's orthopedic, neurological, and cosmetic disabilities for a total award of $15,468. d. at
327, 475 A.2d at 1260. The appellate division reversed and remanded the case for calculation of the award on the basis of the cumulative effect of the "stacked" injuries. Id. at 327-28, 475 A.2d at
1260.
The supreme court, in each of the consolidated appeals, held
that, for compensation purposes, the cumulative impact of separate
injuries arising out of a single incident should be treated as a single
disability. Id. at 323, 475 A.2d at 1258. Justice O'Hern, writing for a
unanimous court, reasoned that N.J. STAT. ANN. §34:15-12(c), when
read in light of its relevant legislative history, distinguishes between
the pleading of separately compensable disabilities in a single claim
and "separate injuries from a single accident that cause a material
lessening of working ability or significant functional disability." Id.
at 332, 475 A.2d at 1263. Thus, the statute's requirement that
awards be entered separately for each disability was interpreted as
permitting a single award for the overall effect of an accident upon
an employee's ability to work. Id. at 329, 475 A.2d at 1261.
In interpreting N.J. STAT. ANN. §34:15-12(c), the court stressed
the importance of putting more money into the hands of the seriously
disabled, finding that goal to be the overriding concern of the legislature when it enacted the 1979 amendments. The court pointed to
the Smith case as illustrative of the seriously injured worker that the
legislature intended to benefit. The cumulative nature of Smith's injuries, such as requiring skin grafts from the abdomen and thigh to
repair the crushed arm, affected his ability to work. The injuries,
therefore, were not separate and distinct. Smith thus was to be considered among those seriously disabled workers for whom the legislature intended to provide "significantly more money." Id. at 328-29,
475 A.2d at 1261. Such increased benefits could only be provided by
"stacking" the injuries into a single disability. Consequently, compensation judges were directed to evaluate all injuries in terms of
their effect upon the individual as a whole. Id. at 330, 475 A.2d at
1262.
The court carried its holistic approach over into its discussion of
the proper method of computing an award when more than one major body part is injured. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §34:15-12(c)(20),
-12(c) (22). The court stated that the compensation courts should analyze the total effect of such injuries and "make a reasonable assessment of the extent of the combined disability in terms of a
percentage of permanent and total disability." Md. at 334, 475 A.2d
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at 1264. Consequently, in those cases the statutory schedule need not
be consulted at all. Id.
In permitting injured workers to "stack" their injuries for compensation purposes, the court placed its reliance upon compensation
judges to evaluate the overall disability and to prevent minor injuries
from artificially pushing a case to the point where larger dollar
amounts are awarded. Although this reliance complicates the role of
the compensation judge, the court's approach to a working definition
of a compensable "disability" is a realistic one that recognizes the
economic consequences of occupational accidents as the primary focus of statutory compensation. By providing more money to seriously disabled workers, the court effectuates the overriding legislative
purpose of the 1979 amendments, thereby advancing the substantive
aim of the law over the technical form of the injuries.
Karlene K Knaub

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY-BREATHALYZER

TEST RESULTS AD-

MISSIBLE-Romano v. Kmme/man, 96 N.J. 66, 474 A.2d 1 (1984).

On April 6, 1983, a municipal court judge found that Smith &
Wesson breathalyzer models 900 and 900A were unreliable because
of their susceptibility to radio frequency interference (rfi). As a result, he prohibited the introduction of test results from those machines in all drunk driving cases. 96 N.J. at 74, 474 A.2d at 5.
Shortly thereafter, seven individuals charged in separate municipal
court actions with driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor sought an injunction in the law division barring use of model
900 and model 900A test results in all pending and future prosecutions under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50 (West Cum. Supp. 19841985), the state's "drunk driving" statute. 96 N.J. at 74-75, 474 A.2d
at 5.
The trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and
issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting introduction of the
test results of models 900 and 900A unless the state demonstrated
that procedures designed by the manufacturer to eliminate the possibility of rfi were followed in administering the test. Id at 75, 474
A.2d at 5-6. The appellate division, noting that each plaintiff would
have the opportunity to challenge the reliability of the test results in
his individual prosecution, reversed and vacated the trial court's re-
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straints. The supreme court granted certification to review the reliability of the challenged breathalyzers. Because the issues raised by
the appeal paralleled the issues in the individual prosecutions, the
court directly certified those seven actions and remanded them to the
law division for a hearing on the admissibility of model 900 and
model 900A test results. Id. at 76, 474 A.2d at 6.
Adopting the findings of the trial court, the supreme court held
that models 900 and 900A were scientifically reliable despite the
equipment's susceptibility to rfi. Moreover, the court determined
that breathalyzer test results would generally be admissible if the
machine "is in proper working order . . . used in accordance with

accepted procedures," and if the test is given by a "qualified operator." Id. at 82, 474 A.2d at 9-10. It reasoned that "[t]he fact that a
possibility of error exists does not preclude a conclusion that a scientific device is reliable." Id. at 80, 474 A.2d at 9. The court, however,
did recognize a narrow exception to this general rule when applied to
model 900A. Id. at 85, 474 A.2d at 11. It held that model 900A
breathalyzer test results could be admitted in evidence provided
either that two tests were performed with results within 0.01 percent
of each other, or that the instrument was determined, through periodic testing, to be insensitive to radio frequency interference. Id. at
87-88, 474 A.2d at 12-13. In the event those two tests had not been
satisfied and a particular machine was determined to be rfi sensitive,
the test results would only be admitted upon proof that hand-held
transmitters and police cars with transmitters were prohibited from
the area and that extra care was taken to avoid outside interference
during the administration of the test. Id. at 88-89, 474 A.2d at 13.
The court placed the burden of establishing the conditions of
admissibility by "clear and convincing proof" upon the state. Id. at
90-91, 474 A.2d at 14. In rejecting a standard requiring proof of
those conditions "beyond a reasonable doubt," the court distinguished between the proofs necessary to establish "ultimate guilt"
and those needed to render scientific evidence admissible. IM.at 8990, 474 A.2d at 13.
This distinction, however, is artificial if not disingenuous. At
the time the prosecutions in Romano arose, the statute only provided
for a presumption of intoxication where a driver's blood alcohol concentration was 0.10 percent or more. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50
(West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984). The statute now presently provides
that a person violates the law if found to be operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent or more. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:4-50 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985). Thus, the only proof
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required to sustain a conviction is proof of a defendant's blood alcohol content. Except in cases where blood samples are taken, proof of
alcohol content will be provided solely by breathalyzer test results.
Under the court's holding, therefore, guilt may be established
through introduction of "clear and convincing proof" that
breathalyzer tests administered in conformity with the Romano guidelines resulted in a reading of 0. 10 or greater. This standard of proof
is inadequate and may not satisfy constitutional requirements. Proof
of guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" should not be determined
under the guise of a lesser standard.
Joanne M. Maxwell

WORKERS' COMPENSATION-DISABILITY PENSION BENEFITS
OFFSET BY PERMANENT DISABILITY AWARD-Young v. Western
Electric Co., 96 N.J. 220, 475 A.2d 544 (1984).
Between December 1956 and June 1976, Roosevelt Young
worked for Western Electric Company, Inc. As the result of a workrelated back injury and an occupational hearing loss, he because permanently and totally disabled. Following his retirement, Western
Electric paid him benefits under its "Plan for Employees' Pensions,
Disability Benefits and Death Benefits" which, as of June 1981, totalled approximately $27,000. 96 N.J. at 223, 475 A.2d at 546.
In November 1977, Young filed a workers' compensation claim.
Id. A judgment awarding him total permanent disability under the
"odd-lot doctrine" was entered in June 1981. Pursuant to this
award, Western Electric owed Young over $30,000 in back benefits.
Western Electric sought an offset against that amount for the $27,000
that it had already paid him under its own plan. The workers' compensation judge determined that it was not within his jurisdiction to
make such an offset and he refused to do so. Id. at 224, 475 A.2d at
546.
On appeal, the appellate division held that the 1977 amendment to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-29 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985),
had deprived the Division of Workers' Compensation of jurisdiction
to reduce the workers' compensation award by the amount of any
retirement benefits previously paid. The appellate panel determined
that under that statute the Division could only award credit for temporary disability pension benefits paid to Young and remanded the
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matter for a determination of the amount to be offset. Id. at 224-25,
475 A.2d at 546-47. On its motion for rehearing, Western Electric
maintained that the benefits it had paid to Young after March 1977
were "disability pension benefits" within the meaning of the 1977
amendment, rather than "retirement pension benefits." Disagreeing,
the court found that the payments were retirement benefits and that,
therefore, Western Electric was not entitled to an offset in the Division of Workers' Compensation. Id. at 224, 475 A.2d at 547.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Western Electric's petition for certification and held that "disability pension benefits may
be set off against both temporary and permanent disability compensation awards." Id. at 232, 475 A.2d at 550. The court determined
that setoffs should be made where payments under an employer's private plan represent payments for disabilities compensable under the
Workers' Compensation Act. Id. It reasoned that benefits, voluntarily paid by an employer, which represent compensation for lost
wages or compensation for physical impairment arising out of jobrelated injuries, should be considered payments in lieu of workers'
compensation. Id. at 226, 475 A.2d at 547. To hold otherwise, the
court believed, would result in double recoveries by injured workers
and would discourage prompt and voluntary payments by employers. Id. at 226-27, 475 A.2d at 548. With regard to retirement benefits, however, the court held that the Division of Workers'
Compensation had no jurisdiction to offset employer payments
against compensation awards. Id. at 232, 475 A.2d at 561.
In analyzing the 1977 amendment to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:1529, the court recognized the "dual significance" of the legislative
plan. First, the plan prohibited reduction of compensation awards
by integrating into them amounts paid or payable under a retirement pension plan. Second, it implicitly acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Division to offset disability benefits against compensation
awards. Id. at 229, 475 A.2d at 549. The first of those legislative
aims was negated by the United States Supreme Court in Alessi v.
Raybeslos-Manhaltan,Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981), wherein it held that the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. § 1001, "had 'meant to establish pension plan regulation as
exclusively a federal concern.' " 96 N.J. at 230, 475 A.2d at 549
(quoting 41essi, 451 U.S. at 523). Because ERISA permitted the reduction of payments received under retirement pension plans to account for workers' compensation awards, the New Jersey statute was
preempted in its application to pensions regulated by ERISA. Id.,
475 A.2d at 549-50 (citing Alessi, 451 U.S. at 524-25). The Young
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court, however, determined that Alessi had not invalidated that portion of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-29 concerned with the jurisdiction of
the Division of Workers' Compensation. Id., 475 A.2d at 549. Thus,
although employers whose retirement pension plans integrate payments made pursuant to those plans with workers' compensation
awards were deemed to be entitled to relief, the court determined
that Alessi had not mandated an expansion of the Division's jurisdiction to include the offsetting of retirement benefits against compensation awards. Id. at 232, 475 A.2d at 551. Employers, therefore, were
directed to seek enforcement of their right to a setoff in the courts.
Id. at 232-33, 475 A.2d at 551.
The result reached in Young indicates that legislative attention
must be given to the jurisdictional gap left in the wake of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Alessi. In Young, the matter was
ultimately remanded to the Division of Workers' Compensation for
determination of the amounts paid under the Westinghouse plan
that were attributable to "disability pension benefits" and "retirement pension benefits." Id. at 235, 475 A.2d at 552. Although, under
Alessi', Westinghouse will be entitled to a setoff in the amount that
the compensation judge determines was paid as retirement benefits,
the judge, bound by the Young decision, will be powerless to order
such relief. As a result, the employer will be forced to seek relief in a
separate action in superior court. The duplication of effort and wasting of judicial resources engendered by this procedure is obvious and
unnecessary. The New Jersey Supreme Court has recently recognized as much in a similar procedural setting, in Wunschel v. Jersey
City, 96 N.J. 651, 664, 477 A.2d 329, 336 (1984), wherein it noted that
the compensation court is the tribunal best equipped to decide employment issues. The legislature, therefore, should eliminate the procedural morass that presently plagues employers when they make
voluntary payments to their disabled employees. An amendment to
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-29, extending the jurisdiction of the Division of Workers' Compensation to encompass the setoff of retirement
benefits against compensation awards, would accomplish this end
without any added costs either to employers or compensation claimants.
Carol M. Romano
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CIVIL PROCEDURE-ENTIRE CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO PARTIES-Crspin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 96 NJ. 336,
476 A.2d 250 (1984).
On December 10, 1977, John Crispin entered the Garden State
Parkway from a construction site in Clark, New Jersey. 96 NJ. at
338-39, 476 A.2d at 251. His 1971 Volkswagen was struck by a car
driven by Victoria Rapicka. Rapicka's car was then struck by one
operated by Joseph Morrison. Id. at 339, 476 A.2d at 251. Crispin's
spine was fractured in the accident, and as a result he suffered permanent paralysis. Id. at 338, 476 A.2d at 251.
Following the accident, Crispin, Rapicka, and Mary Lothrop, a
passenger in the Morrison vehicle, filed separate actions in Union
County. In addition to the other drivers, each plaintiff named as
defendants the New Jersey Department of Transportation and the
contractor who maintained the construction site. These matters were
consolidated for trial in February 1979. The following autumn, Crispin's attorney became aware of a possible defect in the car his client
was driving at the time of the accident. Consequently, on December
7, 1979, he filed a complaint against Volkswagen of America and
Volkswagenwerk of Germany in the law division of the New Jersey
Superior Court in Bergen County. Id. at 339, 476 A.2d at 251.
Crispin's attorney made no attempt to add Volkswagen as a defendant in the Union County cases. Id. at 339-40, 476 A.2d at 25152. No summonses were issued in the Bergen County suit until January 1981. In the interval, the Union County litigation was resolved.
Id at 340, 476 A.2d at 252.
Upon receipt of the summons and complaint, the Bergen
County defendants moved to dismiss. Id at 340-41, 476 A.2d at 252.
They argued that Crispin's failure to make proper service within ten
days of the filing of the complaint was an inexcusable violation of
New Jersey Court Rule 4:4-1. The trial court agreed, but dismissed
the action without prejudice to Crispin's right to bring a new suit. A
new action was commenced in the law division in Essex County in
May 1981. The trial court therein entertained, but denied, Volkswagen of America's motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. Id at 341, 476 A.2d at 252-53. Thereafter, the defendants
sought to dismiss the complaint pursuant to the entire controversy
doctrine. The court, however, held that the doctrine did not mandate the joinder of parties and denied the motion. Id at 342, 476
A.2d at 253.
Both Crispin and Volkswagen filed notices of appeal from the
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decision of the trial court in Bergen County. Id. at 341, 476 A.2d at
252. In addition, Volkswagen filed a motion in the appellate division
for leave to take an interlocutory appeal from the court's refusal to
dismiss the Essex County suit. The appellate division denied the application, and Volkswagen sought review thereof by the supreme
court. The appellate division also affirmed the Bergen County
court's decision to dismiss Crispin's complaint without prejudice.
Volkswagen's petition for certification on that issue was granted.
The court also granted leave to appeal in the Essex County case. Id.
at 342, 476 A.2d at 253.
The supreme court affirmed the appellate division's dismissal
without prejudice of the Bergen County suit. Md.at 345-46, 476 A.2d
at 255. It held that the "decision whether to dismiss with or without
prejudice is reposed in the sound discretion of the trial court under
Rule 4:37-2(a)," and that, given the lack of any substantial prejudice
to Volkswagen, the court in Bergen County had not abused its discretion. Id. at 346, 476 A.2d at 255. With respect to the entire controversy doctrine, the court held that, under the circumstances of the
instant case, the doctrine required the joinder of additional parties.
The court determined, however, that the doctrine should be applied
only prospectively to parties and affirmed the decision of the Essex
County court. Id. at 343, 476 A.2d at 253-54.
In expanding its application of the entire controversy doctrine,
the court reasoned that the "complex webs of causation that arise in
cases of this nature suggest that joinder of known responsible parties
in a single action be the norm." Id. Justice Handler, in a concurring
opinion, observed that the doctrine, "properly understood, encompasses all judicially cognizable facets of a dispute." Id. at 348, 476
A.2d at 256 (Handler J., concurring). Thus, the court determined
that the same principles that required the joinder, in a single action,
of all claims against any party to a suit growing out of the incident
giving rise to the controversy also required the joinder of all potentially responsible parties who have been joined in a related action.
IM. at 343, 476 A.2d at 253. These principles, as set forth by Justice
Handler, center on the need "to preserve essential fairness and avoid
duplicitous litigation." Id. at 350, 476 A.2d at 257 (Handler, J.,
concurring).
The Crispin decision coincides with the recent release by the
supreme court's Committee on Civil Practice of a recommendation
that Rule 4:5-1 be amended to require an attorney's identification in
his pleadings of any related litigation arising out of the matter in
controversy. See 113 N.J.L.J. 705 (1984). The obligation to identify
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such actions would continue throughout the course of the litigation.
The court's decision and the proposed amendment advance the goals
of judicial economy, finality and repose, and overall fairness. The
resolution, where possible, of an "entire controversy" in a single proceeding should not be impeded by an attorney's manipulation of the
rules of practice. The zeal with which a client's claims are prosecuted has its limitations. Courts should not hesitate to fix the limits
of acceptable conduct where such delineation is warranted by the
cost to litigants and the judicial system. Such guidance apparently is
necessary when officers of the court feel justified in concealing the
existence of related lawsuits from the court and interested counsel.
Thomas Donnelly

ZONING AND PLANNING-VARIANCES-HIGHEST

AND BEST

USE IS BASIS FOR PROPERTY VALUATION ONCE HARDSHIP VARIANCE

GRANTED-Nash v. Board of Adjaustment., 96 N.J. 97, 474

A.2d 241 (1984).
Dr. and Mrs. Myles C. Morrison, Jr. owned a home on Overlook
Road in Morris Township, New Jersey. 96 N.J. at 110, 474 A.2d at
248 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). It was situated across the street from a
vacant, undersized lot, which originally conformed to the township
zoning code's minimum lot size of 15,000 square feet. Since the zoning code was changed in 1955, the lot has been nonconforming. Dr.
Morrison acquired the lot by gift in 1976. Id. at 103, 474 A.2d at 244.
In 1979, the Morrisons sold their home to Mr. and Mrs. Causey,
and also contracted to sell the lot to Mr. and Mrs. Rochford. Id. at
110-11, 474 A.2d at 248 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The original contract with the Rochfords contained no contingency for obtaining a
variance to build on the property; however, an amendment with a
reduced purchase price of $34,600, subject to a variance contingency,
was negotiated. The Morrisons also offered to sell the lot to the adjacent property owners for the same price offered to the Rochfords and
received a counter-offer of $17,250. The latter offer was raised to
$22,000 prior to the variance hearings. Id. at 111, 474 A.2d at 248
(O'Hern, J., dissenting).
The Rochfords applied to the Morris Township Board of Adjustment (Board) for hardship variances, under N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 40:55D-70(c) (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985), from the zoning code
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requirements as to lot size, frontage, width, depth, and setback distances. All of the requested variances were granted by the Board,
after hearings which spanned a period of four months. Id. at 104, 474
A.2d at 244. The Board found that the property was suitable for use
only as a single family residence, that it would be impossible to increase the lot size to conform with the zoning criteria, that the neighborhood already contained several other nonconforming lots, and
that development of the lot would be a benefit, rather than a detriment, to the general area. Id. at 104-05, 474 A.2d at 244-45. Although the Board conceded that if the lot was not able to be built
upon its value would be approximately $17,000, it found that the lot
with the variances "had a value of between $31,000 and $34,000."
Id. at 105, 474 A.2d at 245.
In an action in lieu of prerogative writs, the adjoining property
owners sought to set aside the variance. The trial court affirmed the
grant of the variances, but held that the value of the lot should not
be "based on the property's highest and best use," idat 103, 474 A.2d
at 244, but only "on a fair and reasonable use." Id. The court found
no undue hardship since the Morrisons had received such an offer.
The appellate division also affirmed the Board's grant of the variances, but reversed the lower court's determination of the lot's value,
holding that the value of the lot had to be based on its use after the
variances had been obtained. Id The New Jersey Supreme Court
granted certification, 94 N.J. 529, 468 A.2d 183 (1983), to consider
the valuation question. 96 N.J. at 103, 474 A.2d at 244.
Justice Garibaldi, writing for the majority, reviewed the criteria
necessary to obtain a hardship variance. The applicant must demonstrate that undue hardship will be suffered if the variance is not
granted, and that granting the variance will not cause substantial
detriment to the neighborhood or to the zoning plan. Once those
criteria have been met, the variance may, in some circumstances, be
conditioned on the applicant's offering the property to adjacent land
owners at its fair market value. Id. at 102, 474 A.2d at 243. If the
applicant has received an offer to purchase the property at its fair
market value, and has declined to accept that offer, it may be found
that the hardship no longer exists and the variance should be denied.
If no willing buyer can be found, however, the variance should be
granted. Id. at 106, 474 A.2d at 245.
The court interpreted the variance statute as requiring the construction of homes on nonconforming lots to be done, where possible,
without disrupting the overall planning scheme of a municipality.
Based upon that construction, the court found that the correct valua-

236

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:214

tion in such cases is based upon the property's worth as a buildable
lot. Id. at 107-08, 474 A.2d at 246. It considered the dissent's objection that Dr. Morrison would be unjustly enriched by its determination to be without merit, because neither he nor his predecessor in
title had created the hardship. Id. at 108-09, 474 A.2d at 247. Because the benefits of granting a conditional variance inure to the surrounding property owners, the dissent's suggested method of
valuation was also dismissed as permitting neighbors and boards of
adjustment to acquire unwarranted control over a nonconforming
lot. Id. at 109, 474 A.2d at 247. Finally, inasmuch as the property
had been offered to the owners of the adjacent lot at what was determined to be the fair market price, the court affirmed the appellate
panel's decision that the plaintiffs not be afforded another opportunity to purchase it. Id. at 109-10, 474 A.2d at 247-48.
Justice O'Hern, joined by Justice Handler, dissented on the
ground that the $22,000 offer received by the Morrisons constituted
more than the fair market value of the property. He found the situation to be analogous to a condemnation in which the price paid for
the condemned property is not that which it might otherwise have
commanded. Id. at 117, 474 A.2d at 252 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). To
permit a higher valuation would be to allow the speculative enrichment of owners of substandard properties. See id. at 112, 474 A.2d at
249 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The dissent opined that the majority's
valuation of the property as a buildable lot effectively eliminated the
positive criteria of the variance statute. Justice O'Hern would have
reversed the appellate court on the valuation of the lot, but would
have modified the trial court's decision to reduce the sales price to
$22,000. Id. at 120, 474 A.2d at 253 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
Both the majority and the dissent expressed valid concerns with
respect to the valuation problems presented in this case. If a lot is
worth $35,000 as a building site, but only $17,000 as an addition to
an adjoining lot, who is prejudiced by the alternative valuations? If
the property owner paid the lower price, then his neighbor's offer of
that amount after a conditional variance has been obtained will theoretically make him whole-except for the expense of obtaining the
variance. If, however, he actually desires to build on the property,
rejection of the neighbor's offer will leave him with a nonbuildable
lot and the out-of-pocket cost of the variance application. The
court's decision adequately addresses the problems that arise when
property has been acquired for speculative reasons, rather than for
personal use. If the value of a piece of property can be enhanced by
obtaining a variance, with the assurance that the owner will receive
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the increased value, either from the adjoining property owners or
from his contract purchasers, one could understandably envision
making a career of such conversions. The neighboring land owners
would then be forced to pay for something they would not be receiving, i.e., a buildable lot. The Nash court makes no provision for the
different motives outlined in the foregoing situations.
Janet Pruden Bright

